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  1. LOGIC AND INFERENCE IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
  2. Book Review/Jonardon Ganeri, Indian Logic: A Reader
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Schayer was a mathematical logician who trained under Lukasiewicz, the great Polish interpreter of Aristotle's syllogistic theory. Schayer's work on Indian logic marked a turning point, for he brought a detailed knowledge of western logical theory to his interpretation of the Indian systems. His articles are for the first time translated here into English. Bochenski, whose chapter on Indian logic in his A History of Formal Logic again brought the Indian systems to the attention of western scholars, much as Colebrooke's had a hundred and thirty years before.

Frits Staal is widely regarded as a very astute interpreter of Indian logic because of his articles on the topic in the late s. An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while. No cover image. According to Jains, the ultimate principle should always be logical and no principle can be devoid of logic or reason. Thus one finds in the Jain texts , deliberative exhortations on any subject in all its facts, may they be constructive or obstructive, inferential or analytical, enlightening or destructive.

These Jain philosophical concepts made most important contributions to the ancient Indian philosophy , especially in the areas of skepticism and relativity. There is a still living tradition of Buddhist logic in the Tibetan Buddhist traditions, where logic is an important part of the education of monks. This later school began around eastern India and Bengal , and developed theories resembling modern logic, such as Gottlob Frege 's "distinction between sense and reference of proper names" and his "definition of number," as well as the Navya-Nyaya theory of "restrictive conditions for universals" anticipating some of the developments in modern set theory.

According to Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti: [10]. In the third part we have shown how the study of the so-called 'restrictive conditions for universals' in Navya-Nyaya logic anticipated some of the developments of modern set theory. According to this restrictive condition, no universal jati can be admitted to exist, the admission of which would lead to a vicious infinite regress. As an example Udayana says that there can be no universal of which every universal is a member; for if we had any such universal, then, by hypothesis, we have got a given totality of all universals that exist and all of them belong to this big universal.

But this universal is itself a universal and hence since it cannot be a member of itself, because in Udayana's view no universal can be a member of itself this universal too along with other universals must belong to a bigger universal and so on ad infinitum. What Udayana says here has interesting analogues in modern set theory in which it is held that a set of all sets i. In the late 18th-century British scholars began to take an interest in Indian philosophy and discovered the sophistication of the Indian study of inference.

This process culminated in Henry T. Colebrooke's The Philosophy of the Hindus: On the Nyaya and Vaisesika Systems in , [11] which provided an analysis of inference and comparison to the received Aristotelian logic , resulting in the observation that the Aristotelian syllogism could not account for the Indian syllogism. Max Mueller contributed an appendix to the edition of Thomson 's Outline of the Laws of Thought , in which he placed Greek and Indian logic on the same plane: "The sciences of Logic and Grammar were, as far as history allows us to judge, invented or originally conceived by two nations only, by Hindus and Greeks.

Jonardon Ganeri has observed that this period [ which? Indian logic attracted the attention of many Western scholars, and had an influence on pioneering 19th-century logicians such as Charles Babbage , Augustus De Morgan , and particularly George Boole , as confirmed by Boole's wife Mary Everest Boole in an "open letter to Dr Bose" titled "Indian Thought and Western Science in the Nineteenth Century" written in [13] [14].

De Morgan himself wrote in of the significance of Indian logic: "The two races which have founded the mathematics, those of the Sanscrit and Greek languages, have been the two which have independently formed systems of logic. Mathematicians became aware of the influence of Indian mathematics on the European. For example, Hermann Weyl wrote: "Occidental mathematics has in past centuries broken away from the Greek view and followed a course which seems to have originated in India and which has been transmitted, with additions, to us by the Arabs; in it the concept of number appears as logically prior to the concepts of geometry.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Main article: Vaisheshika. Main article: Catuskoti. Main article: Nyaya. Further information: Anekantavada , Syadvada , and Jain philosophy. As head of the Sanskrit College in Benares, Ballantyne inherited from another Scottish Orientalist, Muir, the programme of educating intelligent brahmins by translating Christian and Western philosophical texts into Sanskrit.

Within this text, the treatment of inference acquired special importance, for our modern conception of Induction being that to which is particularly to be attributed our superior progress in science, it 14 Introduction: Indian Logic and the Colonization of Reason appeared highly important Thus even Ballantyne, who was the first to produce good translations of Indian logical texts, and who defended the Nyaya system whenever he found it criticised cf.

Ballantyne , , , ultimately saw the Indian account only as a transitional step from which to develop to a more sophisticated, European mode of scientific knowledge. The pioneer in this field was Stanislaw Schayer, himself a pupil of Lukasiewicz and a keen logician, in addition to being an Indologist of extraordinary ability. We can only do justice to the meaning and possibilities of development of the Indian syllogism by seeing it as a prescientific anticipation of some forms of inference which we know from modern logic. He represented the five steps in this way [Essay 5 this volume, pp.

Schayer thereby identifies the Indian syllogism with a proof in a natural deduction system: Thesis: Fa because Ga. Bochenski [Essay 7]. It might indeed itself be criticised for distorting the proper form of a nyaya argument schema. In pressing the Indian schema into the form of a natural deduction, something of its true nature has been lost.

That being so, much more of the true form is preserved than on the syllogistic interpretation. The key difference between the Aristotelian and the Indian syllogisms is now seen to reside in the nature of the terms involved. In this respect there seems to be a difference between the classic Nyaya logicians and the Tarkasamgraha. The latter, and later, text fairly evidently envisages an inductive proof, while the earlier thinkers intuit the connection of two essences in an individual.

Modest as these results may seem to a western logician, the text undoubtedly attains to the level of genuine formal logic, though it is very far from being formalistic. The continuing importance of examples in Indian style proofs is an embarrassment for the formalistic interpretation, which can only say that their role is to give inductive support to the universal premise.

Forgetting the point, made so long ago by Max Muller and repeated by Schayer himself, that if the Indian syllogism is not judged in its own terms it is bound to appear to be a clumsy version of whatever logic is being used to judge it, Bochenski can find in Indian logic only a modest anticipation of formal logic, and fails to discover a genuinely different theory.

It is seen, not as a sophisticated attempt to 17 Introduction: Indian Logic and the Colonization of Reason solve its own problems, but as an impoverished attempt to solve ours. All this tells us a great deal about European perceptions and preoccupations, and rather less about the true nature of Indian logic. The alternative in the work of Schayer and Bochenski is to translate the Indian schema into a predicate logic, wherein one term is an individual constant e. So the terms are not predicates but names of properties.

The Indian schema is now seen as depending on two relations, one between properties and locations, the other between properties and properties. Many of the characteristic features of Indian logic can now be explained as deriving from peculiarities in the behaviour of the relation of occurrence, or its converse, possession.

Sibajiban Bhattacharyya [Essay 9] and Bimal Matilal [Essay 10] both pursue this line of enquiry, developing Indian logic as a logic of property possession. Much of the technical development of logic in later Nyaya can 18 Introduction: Indian Logic and the Colonization of Reason be seen as an attempt to wrestle with the complexities induced by such notions of property and property-possession. When, for example, one infers that the mountain is fire-possessing, what property is it that the mountain is inferred to have?

The rule in Navya-Nyaya, according to Bhattacharyya, is this volume, p. So the property the mountain is said to possess is fire - fire in general as distinct from either the universal fireness or a given particular fire. Clearly, this is an idea at some remove from the theory of the syllogism or from anything in first-order logic.

Ingalls foresaw the point in his reservation about the formalistic interpretation. The schema for him is best represented as: p has h pervaded-by-s therefore, p has s. To make sense of the schema, Matilal suggests, we ought not to see its propositions as having a subject-predicate structure at all as the formalistic interpretation presumed. Instead, we are to think of the individuation of a property as akin to the individuation of a stuff p.

We may mentally integrate the individually located water stuff in this world into a spatially integrated whole. Then to talk about the water in this glass we can delimit the stuff by its spatio-temporal location. In sum, the object with which one must identify the Nyaya fire is neither any particular body of fire nor the universal fireness, but the stuff feature fire-presence. It is clear that a logic developed along these lines has no easy reduction to syllogistic or subject-predicate forms. It will have to develop its own techniques for the treatment of quantification, and the domain in which it has an application will not coincide with other logical theories, for it will be better suited for formalising and solving some problems, and less so for others.

The task for a modern interpreter of Indian logic is to understand the distinctive problematic within which Indian logic developed, and to evaluate the theory within that context. It is not, as we have now seen, that India did not have rationalist and scientific traditions, nor that European philosophers in the nineteenth 20 Introduction: Indian Logic and the Colonization of Reason century were unaware of them. Yet, initially favourable responses, among European intellectual circles, to reports of Indian contributions to logic, and enthusiasm for the idea that logic had its origins as much in India as in Greece, gave way to a more sceptical and dismissive evaluation of the Indian material.

Mohanty and B. What I have tried to do here is to uncover some of the methods and mechanisms of this myth. Yet those nineteenth century European scholars who took their inspiration from the work of Colebrooke, did try to analyse Indian logical theory with clarity and insight. Colebrooke, I think, deserves recognition for attempting to set comparative philosophy on a secure methodological basis, as William Jones had earlier done for comparative linguistics. What we can see, however, is that any comparative project is liable to catch the Indian theory in a double-bind: either Indian logic is not recognised as logic in the western sense at all; or if it is, then it inevitably appears impoverished and underdeveloped by western standards.

The only way to escape this dilemma is to reclaim for Indian logic its own distinctive domain of problems and applications, to see how it asks questions not clearly formulated elsewhere, and in what way it seeks to solve the problems it sets for itself. Unless we can situate the authors whom we study in relation to our own concerns, what philosophical value rather than value of a historical, biographical, or sociological kind is there in engaging with them? Philosophy is not a discipline carried on according to rules and assumptions fixed once and for all.

On the contrary, it has always involved an attempt to examine and call into question ideas and commitments that are otherwise taken for granted. Thus we do not need to share assumptions with the authors whom we study or worse, pretend that we share them when we do not in order to include them in our discussion. Indeed, it may be the very fact that authors proceed from an underlying position very different from our own that makes studying them valuable: the difference challenges us to reflect on commitments that we would otherwise not even realize that we had.

The effort must continually be made to explain the distinctiveness in the goals, methods and techniques of Indian logic, in order that we might better understand the nature of the challenge that this alternative tradition of inquiry into the basis of reasoned thought presents, most particularly when we assume that our own theories are free from commitments specific to our own history. Panikkar , and S. But he tacitly accepts that there is some one body of texts which constitute this source.

Note too that, as originally used by Cabral, the concept of a return to the source refers not to the rediscovery of a past, textually-grounded, tradition, but to a return to the folk culture of the masses c. The logical texts of the Buddhists, so central to the development of logic in India, were only rediscovered at the end of the nineteenth century, when Vidyabhusana went on his pioneering searches in Tibet.

Their theories are also extensively discussed in the articles in this volume, especially essays 4, 6, 7, 8 and It is the foundational text for the Nyaya school, forming the basis of many commentaries and original treatises. See essay Account of the Writings, Religion, and Manners, of the Hindoos: including translations from their principle works.

Serampore: The Mission Press. Colebrooke, H. Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. I, pp. Reprinted in Miscellaneous Essays, ed. Colebrooke, Vol. II , pp. Die Philosophie im Fortgang der Welt- geschichte. Ritter, A. The History of Ancient Philosophy. Morrision Kennedy, V. Asiatic Journal NS , Vol. Haughton, Sir.

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LOGIC AND INFERENCE IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Mill, J. In Collected Works, Vols. Toronto: University of Toronto Press Ballantyne, J. Lectures on the Nydya Philosophy, embracing the text of the Tarkasangraha. Benares: The Recorder Press. Benares Magazine, Vol. Reprinted in The Pandit, Vol. The Aphorisms of the Nydya Philosophy, by Gautama, with illustrative extracts from the commentary by Visvandtha. Allahabad: Presbyterian Mission Press. Blakey, R. Historical Sketch of Logic. London: H. Roer, E. Division of the Categories of the Nydya Philosophy Bhasapariccheda. Edited and translated by E. Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press.

Hamilton, Sir William. Mirzapore: Orphan Press. Muller, M. Thomson, W. An Outline of the Necessary Laws of Thought. London: Longmans, Green, and co. Ueberweg, F. System of Logic and History of Logical Doctrines. Linsay London: Madden. De Morgan, A. Published under the superintendence of Augustus De Morgan. London: W. Heath, ed. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Morris Vivekananda c. IV: Vivekananda Mary Everest Boole. Cobham, , London. Radhakrishnan, S. Indian Philosophy. London: George Allen and Unwin. My Search for Truth. Published, with and introduction by B. Ahluwalia, Delhi: Newman Group.

Eastern Religions and Western Thought. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Keith, A. Indian Logic and Atomism. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Price, H. The Hibbert Journal, Vol. LIII April , pp. Vidyasagar and the Regeneration of Bengal. Cabral, A. New York. Gopal, S. A Biography. London: Unwin Hyman. Inden, R. Imaging India.

Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Kejariwal, O. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Panikkar, K. Bhattacharya and R. Thapar eds. Rosen, M. Grayling ed. Shah, K. Colebrooke In the preceding essay, the Sdmkhya, theistical as well as atheistical, was examined. From these have branched various subordinate schools of philosophy; which, in the ardour of scholastic disputation, have disagreed on matters of doctrine or of interpretation. The ordinary distinction between them is that of ancients and moderns; besides appellations derived from the names of their favourite authors, as will be more particularly noticed in another place.

It is a maxim, that a section is not to consist of so little as a single sutra; and to make good the rule, some stress is occasionally put upon the text, either splitting an aphorism or associating it incongruously. These the Bhasya especially are repeatedly cited by modern commentators, as well as by writers of separate treatises; but so far as has come under my immediate notice without naming the authors; and I cannot adventure, having no present opportunity of consulting the original scholia in a collective form, to assign them to their proper authors, from recollection of former researches.

Commentaries which are now at hand, and which have been consulted in the course of preparing the present treatise, are the Varttika-tatparya-parisuddhi of the celebrated Udayana-acarya, and the Varttika-tatparya-tlka of the no less celebrated Vacaspati-misra. Separate treatises of distinguished authors teach, and amply discuss, the elements of the science. An easier, and more concise introduction than these abstruse and voluminous works afford, is found requisite to the initiatory study of the science. One of the most approved elementary treatises is the Tarka-bhasa of Kesava-misra, author of many other tracts.

Though adapted to the comprehension of the learner without the aid of a gloss, it has nevertheless employed the labour of many commentators, expounding and illustrating it. Another compendious introduction to the study of Indian logic is the Padartha-dipika 13 by Konda-bhatta, a noted grammarian, author of the Vaiyakarana-bhusana , on the philosophy of grammatical structure. It does not appear to have had any commentator, and it needs none. A work of this description is the Kusumdnjali , 14 with its commentary, by Narayana- tlrtha; another, which likewise is expounded by its author, is the Nydya-sanksepa of Govinda-bhattacharya.

Elementary works only have been here spoken of. No department of science or literature has more engaged the attention of the Hindus than the Nyaya; 16 and the fruit of their lucubrations has been an infinity of volumes, among which are compositions of very celebrated schoolmen. Enunciation, definition, and investigation. Definition laksana sets forth a peculiar property, constituting the essential character of a thing. Investigation pariksd consists in disquisition upon the pertinence and sufficiency of the definition. Consonantly to this, the teachers of philosophy promise the terms of the science, proceed to the definitions, and then pass on to the examination of subjects so premised.

Substance, quality, action, community, particularity, and aggregation or intimate relation: to which a seventh is added by other authors; privation or negation. But the logicians of this school acknowledge but six, or at most seven, above mentioned. Disputation being contemplated in this arrangement, several among these heads relate to controversial discussion. They are, - 1st, proof; 2nd, that which is to be known and proven; 3rd, doubt; 4th, motive; 5th, instance; 6th, demonstrated truth; 7th, member of a regular argument of syllogism; 8th, reasoning by reduction to absurdity; 9th, determination or ascertainment; 10th, thesis or disquisition; 11th, controversy; 12th, objection; 13th, fallacious reason; 14th, perversion; 15th, futility; 16th, confutation.

They are held to be reconcilable: the one more ample, the other more succinct; but both leading to like results. The Samkhya philosophy, as shown in a former essay, 24 affirms two eternal principles, soul and matter; for prakrti or nature, abstracted from modifications, is no other than matter : and reckoning, with these two permanent principles, such as are transient, they enumerate twenty-five. Soul then, as the Bhasya affirms, is that which is to be known and proven. Evidence or proof pramana by which those objects are known and demonstrated, is of four kinds: perception; inference of three sorts consequent, antecedent, and analogous ; comparison; and affirmation comprehending tradition, as well as revelation.

Inference a priori concludes an effect from its cause; inference a posteriori deduces a cause from its effect: another ground of inference is analogy. Or one sort is direct and affirmative; another indirect or negative; and the third is both direct and indirect. For the relation of cause and effect, and for distinguishing different sorts of cause, connexion sambandha or relation, in general, must be considered.

It is two-fold: simple conjunction samyoga , and aggregation or intimate and constant relation samavdya -, the latter being the connexion of things, whereof one, so long as they coexist, continues united with the other: for example, parts and that which is composed of them, as yarn and cloth; for so long as the yarn subsists the cloth remains. Here the connexion of the yarn and cloth is intimate relation; but that of the loom is simple conjunction.

Consonantly to this distinction, cause is intimate or direct, producing aggregation or an intimately relative effect, as clay of pottery or yarn of cloth: or it is mediate or indirect, being proximate to the aggregating cause, as conjunction of yarn, serving for the production of cloth: or thirdly, it is neither direct nor indirect; but instrumental or concomitant, as the loom. Of positive things there must be three causes, and the most efficacious is termed the chief or especial cause: 26 of negative there is but one, which is the third above mentioned.

This would be the place for an ample discussion of the several sorts of proof above mentioned. But they are topics embracing too great a scope of disquisition in the Hindu philosophy, to be adequately considered within the limits of the present essay. The subject, therefore, is reserved for future consideration, in a connected view of it, with relation to the various Indian systems of philosophizing, after they shall have been severally examined. The first and most important of twelve objects of evidence or matters to be proven, enumerated by Gotama, is soul.

For knowledge, desire, aversion volition, pain and pleasure, severally and collectively, argue the existence of soul: since these are not universal attributes, as number, quantity, etc. That distinct substance, which is the substratum of those peculiar qualities, is the soul. This concerns the living soul jivatma , the animating spirit of individual person. Souls then, as is expressly affirmed, are numerous. But the supreme soul Paramdtmd is one: the seat of eternal knowledge; demonstrated as the maker of all things. It experiences the fruit of its deeds; pain or pleasure.

It is eternal, because it is infinite; for whatever is infinite is likewise eternal; as the etherial element akasa. It is the site of effort, of organs of sensation, and of sentiment of pain or pleasure. It is a whole, composed of parts; a framed substance, not inchoative: associated with which, soul experiences fruition; 32 that is, immediate presence of pain or of pleasure, in relation to itself.

It is the site of effort; not of motion simply, but of action tending to the attainment of what is pleasing, and to the removal of what is displeasing. According to some opinions, it consists of three elements, earth, water, and light or heat; for the peculiar qualities of those elements are perceptible in it, since it has smell, clamminess, and warmth: or it consists of four, since there is inspiration as well as expiration of air: or of five, as indicated by odour, moisture, digestion, breath, and cavities.

It consists not of five, nor of four elements: else, as Kanada argues, it would be invisible; for the union of visible with invisible objects is so: instance wind. Nor does it consist of three visible elements, nor of two; for there is no intimate inchoative union of heterogeneous substances.

That such beings are, is proved from authority of the Vedas , which reveal creation of gods and demi-gods. Or the distinction is between such as are propagated by sexes or are otherwise generated. The latter comprehends equivocal generation of worms, nits, maggots, gnats and other vermin, considered to be bred in sweat or fermented filth; and germination of plants sprouting from the ground. Accordingly, the distinct sorts of body are five: 1st, ungenerated; 2nd, uterine or viviparous; 3rd, oviparous; 4th, engendered in filth; 5th, vegetative or germinating.

Next, among objects of proof, are the organs of sensation. An organ of sense is defined as an instrument of knowledge, conjoined to the body and imperceptible to the senses.

They are not modifications of consciousness as the Samkhyas maintain , but material, constituted of the elements, earth, water, light, air, and ether, respectively. That ray of light is not ordinarily visible: just as the effulgence of a torch is unseen in meridian sunshine. But, under particular circumstances, a glimpse of the visual ray is obtained. For instance, in the dark, the eye of a cat or other animal prowling at night. The organ of vision then is lucid; and, in like manner, the organ of hearing is etherial; and that of taste, aqueous as saliva ; and of feeling, aerial; and of smelling, earthly.

The site of the visual organ is the pupil of the eye; of the auditory organ, the orifice of the ear; of the olfactory organ, the nostril or tip of the nose; of the taste, the tip of the tongue; of the feeling, the skin. The organs are six, including an internal organ, termed manas , or mind: not five only, as the followers of Buddha maintain, disallowing an internal sense; nor so many as eleven, which the Samkhyas affirm, comprehending with the senses the organs of action, which they reckon five.

Its existence is proved by singleness of sensation: since various sensations do not arise at one time to the same soul. They only seem to do so when passing rapidly, though successively; as a firebrand, whirled with velocity, seems a ring of fire. It is single; that is, for each soul, one: not so many minds as there are external senses. When it is conjoined with any one of the outward organs, knowledge is received through that organ: when not so conjoined, none comes through that sense, but through any other with which it then is associated.

Were it infinite, it might be united with everything at once, and all sensations might be contemporaneous. It is imperceptible to sight, touch, and other senses, and is inferred from reasoning, as follows: There must be an instrument of apprehension of pain and pleasure, which instrument must be other than the sight, or any external sense; for pain and pleasure are experienced though sight be wanting. Such instrument of painful or pleasurable sensation is termed mind [manas. It is eternal, and is distinct from soul as well as from body, with which it is merely conjoined.

It is reckoned by Kanada among substances; and is the substratum of eight qualities, none of which are peculiar to it, being all common to other substances: viz. Number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, subsequence, and faculty. Substance is the intimate cause of an aggregate effect or product: it is the site of qualities and of action; or that in which qualities abide, and in which action takes place.

Darkness has been alleged by some philosophers; but it is no substance; nor is body a distinct one; nor gold, which the Mtmdmsakas affirm to be a peculiar substance. Those specified by Kanada are: 1. Earth, which, besides qualities common to most substances as number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, gravity, fluidity, and faculty of velocity and of elasticity , has colour, savour, odour, and feel, or temperature. Its distinguishing quality is smell; and it is succinctly defined as a substance odorous.

It is eternal, as atoms; or transient, as aggregates. In either, those characteristic qualities are transitory, and are maturative, as affected by light and heat: for by union with it, whether latent or manifest, former colour, taste, smell, and temperature are in earth of any sort annulled, and other colour, etc. Aggregates or products are either organized bodies, or organs of perception, or unorganic masses. Organized earthly bodies are of five sorts [see body]. The organ of smell is terreous. Unorganic masses are stones, lumps of clay, etc. The union of integrant parts is hard, soft, or cumulative, as stones, flowers, cotton, etc.

Water, which has the qualities of earth; excepting smell, and with the addition of viscidity. Odour, when observable in water, is adscititious, arising from mixture of earthy particles. The distinguishing quality of water is coolness. It is accordingly defined as a substance cool to the feel. It is eternal, as atoms; transient, as aggregates. The qualities of the first are constant likewise; those of the latter inconstant. Organic aqueous bodies are beings abiding in the realm of Varuna.

Unorganic waters are rivers, seas, rain, snow, hail, etc. Light is coloured, and illumines other substances; and to the feel is hot: which is its distinguishing quality. It is defined as a substance hot to the feel.

Book Review/Jonardon Ganeri, Indian Logic: A Reader

It is eternal, as atoms; not so, as aggregates. Organic luminous bodies are beings abiding in the solar realm. The visual ray, which is the organ of sight, is lucid [see organs of perception]. Unorganic light is reckoned four-fold: earthy, celestial, alvine, and mineral. Another distinction concerns sight and feel; as light or heat may be either latent or manifest, in respect of both sight and feel, or differently in regard to either. Thus fire is both seen and felt; the heat of hot water is felt, but not seen; moonshine is seen, but not felt; the visual ray is neither seen nor felt.

Terrestrious light is that, of which the fuel is earthy, as fire. Celestial is that, of which the fuel is watery, as lightning, and meteors of various sorts.

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Alvine is that, of which the fuel is both earthy and watery: it is intestinal, which digests food and drink. Mineral is that which is found in pits, as gold. For some maintain that gold is solid light; or, at least that the chief ingredient is light, which is rendered solid by mixture with some particles of earth. Were it mere earth, it might be calcined by fire strongly urged.

Its light is not latent, but overpowered by the colour of the earthy particles mixed with it. In the Mimamsd , however, it is reckoned a distinct substance, as before observed. Air is a colourless substance, sensible to feel; being temperate neither hot, nor cold. Besides this its distinguishing quality, it has the same common qualities with light, except fluidity that is number; quantity, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, subsequence, and faculty of elasticity and velocity. Its existence as a distinct substance is inferred from feeling. The wind, that blows, is apprehended as temperate, independently of the influence of light: and this temperature, which is a quality, implies a substratum; for it cannot subsist without one: that substratum is air; different from water, which is cold; and from light, which is hot; and from earth, which is adventitiously warm by induction of light.

Air is either eternal as atoms, or transient as aggregates. Organic aerial bodies are beings inhabiting the atmosphere, and evil spirits Pisdcas , etc. The organ of touch is an aerial 35 The Philosophy of the Hindus integument, or air diffused over the cuticle.

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Unorganic air is wind, which agitates trees and other tremulous objects. To these may be added, as a fourth kind of aerial aggregates, the breath and other vital airs. Ether dkdsa , which is a substance that has the quality of sound. Besides that its peculiar and distinguishing quality, it has number viz. Unity , quantity, individuality, conjunction, and disjunction.

It is infinite, one, and eternal. The existence of an etherial element as a distinct substance is deduced, not from distinct perception, but from inference. It is one; for there is no evidence of diversity; and its unity is congruous, as infinity accounts for ubiquity. It is infinite, because it is in effect found everywhere.

It is eternal, because it is infinite. It appears white, from connexion with a lucid white orb; as a rock- crystal appears red by association with a red object. The blue colour of a clear sky is derived, according to Patanjali, 50 from the southern peak of the great mountain Sumeru, which is composed of sapphire. On other sides of Sumeru the colour of the sky is different, being borrowed from the hue of the peak which overlooks that quarter.

Others suppose that the black colour of the pupil of the eye is imparted to the sky blue and black being reckoned tinges of the same colour , as a jaundiced eye sees every object yellow. The organ of hearing is etherial, being a portion of ether dkasa confined in the hollow of the ear, and as affirmed by the author of the Padartha-dlpika endued with a particular and unseen virtue. In the ear of a deaf man, the portion of ether which is there present is devoid of that particular virtue, and therefore it is not a perfect and efficient auditory organ.

Time is inferred from the relation of priority and subsequence, other than that of place. It is deduced from the notions of quick, slow, 36 The Philosophy of the Hindus simultaneous, etc. Young is the reverse of old, as old is of young. This contrast, which does not concern place, is an effect, needing a cause other than place, etc. That cause is time. It has the qualities of number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, and disjunction.

It is one, eternal, infinite.


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  • Dignāga’s Logic of Invention | SpringerLink?

Though one, it takes numerous designations; as past, present, and future, with reference to acts that are so. Place, or space, is inferred from the relation of priority and subsequence, other than that of time. It is deduced from the notions of here and there. It has the same common qualities as time; and, like it, is one, eternal, infinite.

Though one, it receives various designations, as east, west, north, south, etc. Soul, though immaterial, is considered to be a substance, as a substratum of qualities. Material substances are by Kanada considered to be primarily atoms; and secondarily, aggregates. He maintains the eternity of atoms; and their existence and aggregation are explained as follows: 51 The mote, which is seen in a sunbeam, is the smallest perceptible quantity. Being a substance and an effect, it must be composed of what is less than half itself: and this likewise is a substance and an effect; for the component part of a substance that has magnitude must be an effect.

This again must be composed of what is smaller, and that smaller thing is an atom. It is simple and uncomposed; else the series would be endless: and, were it pursued indefinitely, there would be no difference of magnitude between a mustard-seed and a mountain, a gnat and an elephant, each alike containing an infinity of particles.

The ultimate atom then is simple. The first compound consists of two atoms: for one does not enter into composition; and there is no argument to prove, that more than two must, for inchoation, be united. The next consists of three double atoms; for, if only two were conjoined, magnitude would hardly ensue, since it must be produced either by size or number of particles; 37 The Philosophy of the Hindus it cannot be their size and therefore it must be their number. Nor is there any reason for assuming the union of four double atoms, since three suffice to originate magnitude.

The qualities that belong to the effect are those which appertained to the integrant part, or primary particle, as its material cause: and conversely, the qualities which belong to the cause are found in the effect. In the integrant parts of an aggregate substance resulting from composition, as in the potsherds of an earthen jar, action is induced by pressure attended with velocity, or by simple pressure.

Disjunction ensues; whereby the union, which was the cause of inchoation of members, is annulled; and the integral substance, consisting of those members, is resolved into its parts, and is destroyed; for it ceases to subsist as a whole. Quality is closely united with substance; not, however, as an intimate cause of it, nor consisting in motion, but common; not a genus, yet appertaining to one. It is independent of conjunction and disjunction; not the cause of them, nor itself endued with qualities. It is a peculiar quality to be apprehended only by sight; and abides in three substances; earth, water and light.

It is a characteristic quality of the last; and, in that, is white and resplendent. In water, it is white, but without lustre. In the primary atoms of both it is perpetual; in their products, not so. In earth it is variable; and seven colours are distinguished: viz. White, yellow green, red, black, tawny or orange , 56 and variegated.

The varieties of these seven colours are many, unenumerated. The six simple colours occur in the atoms of earth; and the seven, including variegated, in its double atoms, and more complex forms. The colour of integrant parts is the cause of colour in the integral substance. It is a peculiar quality, to be apprehended only by the organ of taste; and abides in two substances, earth and water. It is a characteristic quality of the last; and in it is sweet. It is perpetual in atoms of water; not so in aqueous products.

In earth it is variable; and six sorts are distinguished: sweet, bitter, pungent, astringent, acid, and saline.

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It is a peculiar quality, to be apprehended only by the organ of smell; and abides in earth alone, being its distinguishing quality. In water, odour is adscititious, being induced by union with earthy particles; as a clear crystal appears red by association with a hollyhock, or other flower of that hue. In air also it is adscititious: thus a breeze, which has blown over blossoms, musk, camphor, or other scented substances, wafts fragrant particles of the blossoms, etc.

The flowers are not torn, nor the musk diminished; because the parts are replaced by a reproductive unseen virtue. However, camphor and other volatile substances do waste.